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KENTUCKY PROCEDURE-REVIEWABILITY OF TRIAL COURT
DECREES IN DIVORCE
In Damro v. Damron,' a divorce suit was filed by the wife for
an absolute divorce and custody of the couple's two infant children.
On counterclaim, the court granted the absolute divorce and custody
of the children to the husband. An award of alimony was made to
the wife and one-half interest in the joint property. The Court of
Appeals held the Pike Circuit Court had made a mistake in granting
the absolute divorce to the husband, as the proper ruling should
have been a divorce from bed and board, but even so, they were
without power to reverse the part of the judgment granting the
divorce. However, the court did have jurisdiction of the rest of the
judgment and a reversal was made with directions to grant the wife
an allowance for maintenance and custody of the children, with a
proper amount for the support of each.
The writer intends in this note to make a short examination of
the uniqueness of the Kentucky divorce procedure, to point out un-
usual limitations existing in the procedure of three other states, to
give a brief resume of the general method of procedure and to sug-
gest a method to remedy the evils existing in the present divorce
procedure in Kentucky
The Damron case typifies the usual problems raised on appeal
in the majority of divorce suits in Kentucky. It is especially notice-
able that even though the chancellor' has erred in granting the
divorce, that the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to reverse
the decree.3 Ths has included cases where the judgment awarding
the divorce was not warranted by the evidence,' fraud practiced in
procedural matters not sufficient to divest the court of jurisdiction,,
insufficiency of the petition,' or impropriety of the manner of taking
proof." Apparently, the only situations where the decree granting the
divorce can be reviewed are those where the court lacks jurisdic-
tion.8 Yet, even in this instance, the decree will not be reversed
where the marital status has been changed by remarriage.'
'301 Ky 649, 192 S.W 2d 473 (1945).
2"A jury shall not be impaneled in any action for divorce, ali-
mony or maintenance, but courts having general equity jurisdiction
may grant a divorce for any of the causes enumerated in KRS
403.020. A judgment of divorce authorizes either party to marry
again." Ky. R. S. sec. 403.010 (1948).
'Distler v. Distler, 301 Ky 331, 191 S.W 2d 226 (1945).
'Ratliff v. Ratliff, 307 Ky 282, 210 S.W 2d 969 (1948), Baker v.
Baker, 302 Ky. 396, 194 S.W 2d 825 (1946).
5Winfrey v Winfrey, 286 Ky 245, 150 S.W 2d 689 (1941).
'Bushong v Bushong, 272 Ky. 474, 114 S.W 2d 735 (1938).
'Ibid.
See Maher v. Maher, 295 Ky. 263, 174 S.W 2d 289 (1943)
Moran v Moran, 281 Ky 739, 137 S.W 2d 418 (1940).
STUDENT NOTEs AND COMMENTS
The right to review the decree granting the divorce is expressly
denied by statute."' When this statute was first enacted by the gen-
eral assembly in 1816,"1 its primary purpose was to prevent an in-
justice to the party remarrying and to the children.'
- In Thornberry
v.Thornberry,' the court for the first time defined the limitations
imposed upon the Court of Appeals by this statute in reviewing
divorce litigation. In this case, both the divorce and the division of
the estate were granted in favor of the wife. The husband brought
writ of error for a revision of the part of the decree dividing the
estate. The court in interpreting the statute stated:
"It is true, the divorce and division of estate may
be written in one decree; but it is equally true, that
the subjects are different and may or may not be so
blended, and each requires a different adjudication
from the court below; and, therefore, we conceive that
only so much as directs a divorce, is taken from this
court on a writ of error.
' ' u
The Court of Appeals has applied this basic principle in deter-
mining that the following matters relating to divorce were not within
the scope of the statute: alimony,' property rights," restoring to
the wife her maiden name," attorney's fees," and the awarding of
the custody of the children.' Thus, it can be seen that there will be
few, if any, divorce cases in which the parties do not have a limited
right of appeal. With this power to reverse the decree in other re-
spects, it is arguable that the appellate court can indirectly accom-
plish the same result although without power to reverse the divorce
decree. In Lester v. Lester,"' the court held that the wife should not
complain because the divorce was granted to the husband, even
though the evidence warranted a divorce in her favor, since the
judgment had the effect of freeing her from the duties of the mar-
riage. However, this assumption by the court is not always correct.
In a small community the self respect of the wife, as well as the
respect of the community, is dependent upon the wife's being granted
the divorce, notwithstanding the fact that a fair and just settlement
in other respects was ordered on appeal.
Further investigation discloses that in many instances, the pro-
cedural statute preventing appeal defeats the purpose of the sub-
stantive statute which sets forth the grounds sufficient for granting
"Ky. R.S. sec. 21.060 (1) (b) (1948)
' 1 DIGEST OF THE STAT. LAWS OF Ky. 136 (Morehead and Brown,
1834).
"See Thornberry v Thornberry, 14 Ky. (4 Litt.) 251,252 (1823).
'0Ibid.
1 Ibid.
",Smith v. Smith, 297 Ky. 395, 180 S.W 2d 275 (1944).
'"Pleasnick v. Pleasnick, 215 Ky. 281, 284 S.W 1070 (1926).
"Rayburn v. Rayburn, 300 Ky. 209, 187 S.W 2d 804 (1945).
"Clay v. Clay, 301 Ky 209, 191 S.W 2d 819 (1946).
'0Ibid.
296 Ky. 691, 178 S.W 2d 423 (1944).
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a divorce. In several cases the appellate court has acknowledged
there was insufficient evidence to grant an absolute divorce, but
even so, they could not reverse the decree' Yet, it is a fundamental
principle of domestic relations law that the state is interested as a
third party in maintaiinng the marital status." The legislature has
expressly provided that no absolute divorce will be granted unless
the certain prescribed statutory causes are shown.' Even though the
granting of divorces is not viewed m the same light as it was sev-
eral decades ago, nevertheless, marriage " is an institution in
the maintenance of which m its purity the public is deeply inter-
ested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, without
which there would be neither civilization nor progress."2 It is es-
sential in many cases where doubt exists that divorce be limited or
refused because of the presence of children, religious obligations,
property rights and chances of reconciliation. Therefore, it is im-
portant in cases of divorce where many issues are involved that
renew be had.
In other jurisdictions, similar unusual procedural limitations
have existed. For example, until recently, the Georgia Statutes" re-
quired two concurrent verdicts rendered at different terms of court,
prior to the granting of an absolute divorce. Despite the necessity
for two concurrent verdicts, the first verdict was deemed a final
order for the purpose of appellate review." The necessity for con-
current verdicts was elimnnated by the following statute:
"Total divorces in proper cases may be granted by
the superior court. Unless an issuable defense is filed,
or jury trial demanded in writing by either party on or
before the call of the case for trial, the judge shall hear
and determine all issues of law and fact in all petitions
for divorce and permanent alimony, and any other is-
sues made in the pleadings. If a verdict or judgment is
rendered authorizing the grant of a total divorce or for
total divorce and permanent alimony, the verdict or
judgment shall not become final for a period of thirty
days. At the expiration of said period of thirty days
the said verdict or judgment, either or both, shall be-
come of full force and effect, unless some person at in-
terest shall file in said court a written petition setting
forth good and sufficient grounds for the modification
or setting aside of such verdict or judgment. If such a
petition is filed it shall be decided by the judge, unless
a jury trial of the issues raised thereby is demanded
by any party "'
'Damron v. Damron, 301 Ky. 649, 192 S.W 2d 473 (1945),
Distler v Distler, 301 Ky. 31, 191 S.AW 2d 226 (1945).
See Widders v Widders, 207 Ark. 596, -, 182 S.W 2d 209, 211
(1944), Hove v Hove, 219 Minn. 590, -, 18 N.W 2d 580, 582 (1945),
Smith v Smith, 69 R.I. 403, -, 34 A. 2d 726, 728 (1944).
'Ky. R. S. sec. 403.020 (1948).
'Maynard v Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1887).
"Dugas v. Dugas, 201 Ga. 190, -, 39 S.E. 2d 658, 659 (1946).
"Id. at-, 39 S.E. 2d at 660.
Id. at , 39 S.E. 2d at 659.
STUDENT NOTES AND C03IENTS
In Dugas v. Dugas," the Georgia court decided the question
under this statute as to whether an appeal would lie prior to the
expiration of the thirty day period. The court was not unanimous in
its opinion. The majority of the court felt that the effect of the filing
of the petition subsequent to the verdict was substantially equiva-
lent to another trial. Under this view, upon the filing of the petition,
the statute provides practically the same procedure as that of the
antecedent legislation. If this interpretation of the majority opinion
is correct, then the writer believes that their holding is wrong and
he agrees with that part of the dissent which contends that the
primary purpose of the act was to prevent the necessity of concur-
rent verdicts. It would seem that if the statute is interpreted cor-
rectly, that the controlling part of the act is whether the petition
sets forth good and sufficient ground to require another trial.
Whether the petition has set forth sufficient grounds is within the
discretion of the trial judge, and a second trial is available only if
sufficient cause is shown. If the petition is not accepted for this
reason, then a bill of exceptions could be taken after the expiration
of thirty days, both to the denial of the petition and any other excep-
tion taken at the trial. Despite the unique trial procedure in the
lower court, this method does provide an adequate remedy for
appeal.
An unusual limitation also exists in the Louisiana divorce pro-
cedure. A decree from bed and board is granted in the first instance
where sufficient proof is supplied to meet the statutory grounds for
an absolute divorce. -' After the expiration of one year,2' the party
in whose favor the separation from bed and board was entered may
bring a second action and obtain an absolute divorce." The granting
of the absolute decree is founded upon a matter of right and the
only evidence admissible is that there has been no reconciliation
during the probation period provided by statute."
In like manner, unique limitations exist in Tennessee divorce
procedure. In this state the law and equity courts have concurrent
'201 Ga. 190, 39 SXE. 2d 658 (1946).
'LA. CIV. CODE, art. 139 (Dart, 1939).
" However, in cases where the party has been sentenced to an
infamous punishment, or guilty of adultry, the one year limitation is
not required and the absolute divorce decree is granted in the same
decree which pronounces the separation from bed and board. LA. CrV.
CODE, art. 139 (Dart, 1939).
"'Failure to make application within one year and sixty days
subsequent to the judgment of separation entitles the other party to
a right to secure the absolute divorce. However, the obtaining of the
divorce will not affect any rights granted by the first decree. August
v. Blache, 200 La. 1029, 9 So. 2d 402 (1942).
'August v. Blache, 200 La. 1029, 9 So. 2d 402 (1942). Appeal is
provided within thirty days following the granting of either a sepa-
ration from bed and board or an absolute divorce. LA. GEN. STAT.
sec. 2210 (Dart, 1939)
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jurisdiction over divorce proceedings.' However, where the case is
tried in a law court, the judge must try the case by equity proceed-
ings.' Either party to the action has a statutory right to have the
issues tried by a jury,' and the proceedings are conducted as other
jury trials at law." Thus, appeal may be taken from the denial of a
motion for a new trial27 In those instances where the right to a
jury is waived, and the proceedings are conducted as in other equity
trials, the record is reviewable de novo."
A wide variance in divorce procedure is to be expected because
jurisdiction must be expressly conferred upon the courts by statute
or constitutional provision.' Vernier classifies procedural authority
in the different jurisdictions as follows: those states where the sec-
tion on divorce contains specific rules of procedure for divorce
actions; those states where the rules for divorce procedure are found
in the general chapter on procedure; those states providing that
divorce procedure, except as otherwise stated, shall be as in equity,
as in other civil actions, or as in ordinary suits; and those states
where the procedure must be ascertained from the type of procedure
followed by the court given jurisdiction."0
Statutes conferring jurisdiction upon the courts in divorce pro-
ceedings may be divided into two general groups: statutes specially
designating that probate,4 county, 2 superior,4 3 circuit," or district
court,' shall have jurisdiction and those statutes providing that
courts of chancery," or equity,4 7 shall have jurisdiction to try divorce
cases. '
"TENN. CODE ANN. secs. 10325, 10379 (Williams, 1934)
Id. sec. 10329. Hall v Jacocks, 52 Tenn. (5 Heiskell) 84 (1871).
Id. sec. 8436.
•Id. sec. 10575.
Id. sec. 9037. Broch v Broch, 164 Tenn. (11 Smith) 219, 47
S.W 2d 84 (1932)
ITENN. CODE ANN. sec. 9036 (Wlliams, 1934).
Right to a divorce did not exist in this country as a common
law right. McGowin v McGowin, 122 Fla. 394, 165 So. 274 (1936),
State ex rel. Knapp v. Cowan, 230 Mo. App. 226, 88 S.W 2d 424
(1935), Reisman v -Reisman, 46 N.Y.S. 2d 335 (1944).
40 2 VERNIER, AMERIcAN FAMILY LAWS 130 (1932)
412 MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 215 sec. 3 (1932)
" County court has jurisdiction when the alimony asked does
not exceed two thousand dollars, otherwise the district court has
jurisdiction. 2 COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 56 sec. 3 (1935).
"32 ARIz. CODE sec. 27-801 (1939), 2 CONN. GEN. STAT. sec. 5174
(1930)
11 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 40, sec. 5 (1945).
"2 IDAHO CODE ANN. sec. 31-715 (1932).
" ARK. STAT. sec. 4381 (Pope, Supp. 1944).
47KY. R. S. sec. 403.010 (1948), MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, sec. 38
(Flack, 1939)
"Many venue statutes require that the divorce be heard in the
couiify where the parties reside at the time of their separation, or
wheFe the defendant resides if within the state, or where the plaintiff
resides. Mo. REV. STAT. sec. 1515 (1939), TENN. CODE ANN. sec. 8429
(Williams, 1934), VA. CODE ANN. sec. 5105 (1942), W VA. CODE ANN.
STUDENT NOTES AND COMIENTS
The divorce action is begun by the filing of a petition," libel,'
or complaint" setting forth the cause for seeking the divorce. The
usual practice is that the defendant after answer may file a cross
action 2 for a divorce, thereby permitting the settlement of the con-
troversy in one action.
Although divorce proceedings are not purely common law or
equitable proceedings,' the courts generally follow rules of equity
and apply equitable principles.' Thus, divorce cases in the trial
court are usually tried before a chancellor or judge without a jury'
Upon sufficient findings, judgment is entered in favor of the party
establishing sufficient grounds for a divorce.
A very common practice in granting the absolute decree is to
provide either for an interlocutory decree which shall become final
upon the expiration of a definite time,' or for a final decree to be
entered by the trial court where there is a statute prohibiting re-
marriage until the lapse of a specified time.7 Either of these proce-
dures prevents remarriage until the expiration of a definite period
thereby providing an adequate time during which an appeal may be
taken.
Errrors in divorce cases are generally reviewable by appeal,' or
writ of error."' On appeal, a presumption of correctness exists in
favor of the decree as rendered' and the party appealing has the
sec. 4709 (1943) In some states, compliance with the statute is not
a prerequisite to give the court jurisdiction and may be waived by
the parties. King v. King, 237 Mo. App. 764, 170 S.W 2d 982 (1943),
McFerrm v McFerrin, 28 Tenn. App. 552, 191 S.W 2d 946 (1945'
But cf. White v. White, 181 Va. 162, 24 S.E. 2d 448 (1943), Morgan v.
Vest, 125 W Va. 367, 24 S.E. 2d 329 (1943).
'"Allen v. Allen, 194 Ga. 591, -, 22 S.E. 2d 136, 137 (1942).
'PA. STAT., tit. 23, sec. 25 (Purdon, 1936)
'Fowler v. Fowler, 156 Fla. 316, -, 22 So. 2d 817, 818 (1945).
Klumpp v Klumpp, 289 Mich. 97, 286 N.W 171 (1939)
' State ex rel. Couplin v Hostetter, 334 Mo. 770, 129 S.W 2d 1
(1939).
' Id. at-, 129 S.W 2d at 2.
'2 VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 40, 134. In Texas, a jury is op-
tional and if parties request a jury, its finding is only advisory and
may be accepted or rejected at the discretion of the court. Scannell
v. Scannell, 117 S.W 2d 538 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
"WIs. STAT. sec. 247.37 (1943), CALIF. CIV. CODE secs. 131, 132
(Deering, 1941), DEL. REV. CODE secs. 3518, 3519 (1935), 2 COLO.
STAT. ANN. c. 56, sec. 13 (1935)
"'ARIZ. CODE sec. 27-807 (1939), 2 ORE. COMP. LAWS ANN. sec.
9-916 (1940), W VA. CODE ANN. sec. 4722 (1943).
-ALA. CODE tit. 7, sec. 789 (1940), ARz. CODE ANN. sec. 27-817
(1939).
: 2 CoLo. STAT. ANN, C. 56, sec. 16 (1935), Mo. REV. STAT. sec.
1524 (1939).
" Stephens v. Stephens, 233 Ala. 178, 170 So. 767 (1936), Bag-
well v. Bagwell, 153 Fla. 471, 14 So. 2d 841 (1943), Clardy v.
Clardy, 23 Tenn. App. 608, 136 S.W 2d 526 (1940), Hurley v Hurley,
127 V Va. 744, 34 S.E. 2d 465 (1945)
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burden of proving that the findings and judgment are against the
clear weight of the evidence." In a few jurisdictions, the entire
record is reviewable de novo,' but even in these jurisdictions great
weight is given to the findings of the trial judge because of his op-
portunity to observe the parties and to be familiar with the problems
of the case. '
As previously noted, some change is needed in the Kentucky
procedure which denies a right to review the absolute decree. It is
submitted that K.R.S. 21.060 (1) (b) be repealed and replaced with
a more desirable method of procedure. Such a procedure should
contain a provision authorizing the granting of an appeal and the
prohibiting of a remarriage until an appeal can be taken. This can
be accomplished by enacting legislation modeled after the Wisconsin
Statute" which provides for an interlocutory decree. Upon the en-
tering of the decree, the parties are barred from cohabitation. '
However, authority is given the court to vacate or modify the decree
upon its own motion or upon application of either party. Vacation
of the decree restores the parties to the former marital status. Upon
the expiration of one year the decree becomes final unless an appeal
is pending, and in this case the decree becomes final upon determina-
tion of the appeal unless reversed. ' This type of procedure would
provide several advantages over the present existing procedure.
Foremost, a right is provided for review and in addition the delay
in granting the final decree allows adequate time during which
the court may discover any fraud or collusion. It further affords
time for reconciliation and reduces the possibility of a hasty divorce.
In concluding, it is noted that a wide variance exists in divorce
procedure in the various jurisdictions. Further, the Kentucky di-
vorce procedure does not afford an adequate remedy to accomplish
the result that is needed for the protection of the parties or for the
benefit of society. It is suggested that K.R.S. 21.060 (1) (b) pre-
venting the right of review of the absolute decree should be re-
I Forrester v Forrester, 193 Okla. 59, 141 P 2d 92 (1943).
' Mewbern v Mewbern, 201 Ark. 741, 146 S.W 2d 708 (1941),
Davis v. Davis, 228 Iowa 764, 292 N.W 804 (1940), Isham v. Isham,
311 Mich. 240, 18 N.W 2d 702 (1945), Bova v. Bova, 135 S.W 2d
384 (Mo. App. 1940), Lippmcott v. Lippmcott, 141 Neb. 186, 3 N.W
2d 207 (1942), Rose v. Rose, 124 Pa. Super. 437, 188 Atl. 595 (1937).
' Lewis v Lewis, 235 Iowa 639, 17 N.W 2d 407 (1945), Fergu-
son v Ferguson, 310 Mich. 630, 17 N.W 777 (1945)
"Wis. STAT. sec. 247.37 (1943)
SThe parties are subject to punishment for cohabitation fol-
lowing the entry of the interlocutory decree. Wis. STAT. sec. 247.37
(1943).
In case of death of either party during the intermediate period,
the decree, unless vacated, is deemed to have severed the marital
relation immediately before death. This provision provides for ade-
quate protection of property rights. Wis. STAT. sec. 247.37 (1943).
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pealed and replaced by a statutory provision providing for an inter-
locutory decree and a right to review the decree by the Court of
Appeals.
JoHN J. LARION.
